News18 November 2026

Uncloaked: The Optimizely Attack Hit 178 Organisations That Didn't Change a Line of Their Own Code

Uncloaked: The Optimizely Attack Hit 178 Organisations That Didn't Change a Line of Their Own Code

Uncloaked: The Optimizely Attack Hit 178 Organisations That Didn't Change a Line of Their Own Code

On 16 November, attackers planted malicious code in Optimizely, a widely used A/B testing platform. For about 19 hours it ran on the websites of at least 178 organisations, including news publishers, banks, airlines, retailers and software companies. Reported affected sites include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce, IKEA and Equifax.

None of those companies changed their own code. They didn't deploy anything, and nobody on their teams made a mistake. The attack arrived inside a script they already trusted, loaded from a vendor they had good reason to trust.

That makes it the clearest example this year of a simple, uncomfortable rule: your site is only as secure as the least secure script it loads.

Below: how it worked, what limited it, an honest account of what a Decloak scan would have shown, what we're planning, and two other stories from the same week.

1. The Optimizely attack

How it worked

Optimizely lets customers add their own code to every page through a "Project JavaScript" field. That code is bundled into the snippet each site loads from Optimizely's CDN. The attacker wrote a small loader into that field, customer by customer, and Optimizely's own infrastructure delivered it.

Because the rest of the snippet looked normal, nothing obviously broke. Sites that host a copy of the snippet on their own domain were affected too. Report URI, which led much of the analysis, confirmed this was not CDN cache poisoning.

Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product, which has since been fixed, and that it has removed the injected code. All infected snippets were cleaned by 23:11 UTC on 16 November.

What it did

PayloadWho it targetedWhat it did
Crypto clipperEvery visitorReplaced crypto wallet addresses on the page with the attacker's
Card skimmerAnyone submitting a valid card number, expiry and CVVSent the card details to an attacker-controlled domain
Cookie and screenshot theftVisitors who saw a swapped address near wallet or payment wordingSent cookies, the page address and a screenshot to the attacker
iOS exploit kitsiPhones and iPads onlyServed exploit kits for iOS 13 to 18, and reloaded vulnerable pages every 60 seconds to retry

Card fields inside hosted payment iframes, such as those provided by a payment processor, were out of the skimmer's reach.

About US$7,040 in crypto had been traced to the attackers' wallets at the time of reporting. How many cards or devices were compromised is not known.

The timeline

The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on 16 November. The attackers' main domain was registered an hour later, the card skimmer was added at 13:43, and mass clean-up began at about 20:40. All infected files were clean by 23:11.

It didn't start that day. One of the iOS exploit domains was registered on 9 November, and an earlier wave from 13 November used the same tooling through other third-party scripts. The attackers' domains were suspended on 17 November.

How it was found

Not by a scanner looking at a page once. It was found by people comparing script snapshots over time. A public scanning service had captured the BBC's snippet before and after the change, and a Last-Modified header showed when Zoom's changed. Report URI then fetched 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations. The real number is probably higher.

What would have limited the damage

Report URI analysed 256 affected sites. Its findings are worth acting on this week:

Our guide to what Content-Security-Policy actually does explains how to start with report-only mode without breaking anything.

What a Decloak scan would have shown, honestly

We checked our scanner's code against this attack. This is an analysis, not a live test: the attackers' domains were suspended before we could scan one. A scan that happened to run during those 19 hours would have shown signs that something was wrong. It would not have named the theft.

SignalWould it fire?Finding
Browser records every requestYesThe attacker's script appears in the page's network traffic
Script injected by a third partyYes"Dynamically injected script tag", medium
Unrecognised third-party domainYes"Unknown third-party domain loading resources", medium
Domain looks newly registeredYes"Potentially recently registered domain", medium. A guess from the domain's name, not a registry lookup
Known malware domainOnly if threat data had listed it in time"Known malicious domain", critical
Content Security PolicyYesA missing or weak CSP is flagged with fix advice. That's the control that actually stopped this attack on some sites

What it would have missed:

What we're planning

We've added client-side supply-chain detection to our roadmap. It's planned, not built, and it doesn't have a release date yet.

The idea is simple. Malicious code can be disguised, but stolen data still has to leave the page. So instead of hunting for code that looks suspicious, our browser would plant fake data and watch where it goes.

Planned checkHow it would work
Card skimmer testOn pages with payment fields, type a public test card number, block the real submit, and trace the digits in every outgoing request, whether plain or encoded
Crypto address testPlace test wallet addresses on the page and in the clipboard, and check whether anything swaps them
Every script analysedAnalyse every script the browser actually runs, including ones injected after the page loads
Script change alertsKeep a script inventory on scheduled scans and alert when a page starts loading code from somewhere new
Real domain ageLook up each domain's registration date, rather than estimating it
iPhone passOne extra page load as an iPhone on scheduled scans, compared with desktop

Against this attack, those checks would have produced critical findings naming the script that sent card data, and the swapped wallet address on any page. Even then, the limits are real:

2. The bank outage that wasn't an attack

On the same day, thousands of JPMorgan Chase customers reported problems checking balances and making transfers, and complaints spread to other banks and Zelle. With a major supply chain attack in the headlines, plenty of people assumed the two were connected.

They weren't. Chase said the problem was a temporary software issue in its on-premises hardware systems, with no evidence of a cyberattack, and that customers kept access to their accounts and funds. Other banks said their own systems were fine, and that delays came from payments involving Chase. Transactions were posting normally again by that evening.

It's worth including because it's a useful reminder: not every outage is an attack, and treating every outage as one makes it harder to spot the ones that are. Resilience failures and security failures look the same to customers, but they need different responses.

3. Irish credit unions hit through a shared provider

In Ireland, around 40 credit unions reportedly notified the Data Protection Commission of a data breach linked to a third-party IT service provider that processes member account data. Reports say payee details, including names, account numbers and addresses, may have been exposed for a large number of account holders. The Irish League of Credit Unions says members' own accounts and balances were not compromised and that the vulnerability has been closed.

Many details are still unconfirmed, including exactly which credit unions are affected and when the breach happened. The pattern, though, is the same one as Optimizely's: a shared supplier, trusted by many organisations at once, becomes the single point where all of them are exposed.

The common thread

Two of this week's three stories came down to a third party many organisations trusted at once. In neither case did the affected organisations do anything unusual. They used mainstream suppliers in a normal way.

You can't audit every supplier's security. You can control three things this week:

  1. Know what you load. List every third-party script on your key pages, and every supplier that touches your customers' data. Our guide to mapping the domains your pages talk to is a good place to start.
  2. Add a CSP in report-only mode, with reporting on. It costs nothing to deploy, breaks nothing, and would have shown this attack within minutes.
  3. Review who can change your scripts without a deploy. That includes your A/B testing tool, your tag manager and anything else with a "custom code" field. Require strong sign-in for every account that can publish. Sources: Report URI, "World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely" [ADD URL], BleepingComputer [ADD URL], The Record [ADD URL], Krebs on Security [ADD URL], The Register [ADD URL], Malwarebytes [ADD URL], StepSecurity on OPTIMJACK, Security Affairs on OPTIMJACK, Cybersecurity News on the Chase outage, RTÉ on the credit union breach

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